

Role of Military Elite in Politics of Pakistan; A Case Study of Imran Khan's Government (2018-2022)

Arzoo Arif¹, Mahnoor Kashmala², Mairaj-ul-Hamid³

¹ BS Political Science, University of Malakand

² BS Political Science, University of Malakand

³ Lecturer in Political Science, University of Malakand. mairajulhamid717@gmail.com

Corresponding Author: Mairaj-ul-Hamid

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.63163/jpehss.v3i3.506>

Abstract

This study examines the lasting impact of the military upon Pakistan's political scene as regards the recent ascent and decline of Imran Khan's regime. Since Pakistan became independent, its civil along with military bureaucracies have made policy centrally, often sidelining democratic institutions. Early dominance was achieved by Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Iskandar Mirza, Ayub Khan, and Ghulam Muhammad; they were called the "Gang of Four". This dominance did lay a foundation for any military intervention. For example, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy and the Ayub-Mirza alliance depict some events. The civil bureaucracy enabled military ascendancy for that time. In the late 1950s, the military was dominant among political forces. The 2018 general elections culminating this historical trend into the 21st century saw Imran Khan's electoral success through important military backing. However, power dynamics shifted as well as tensions grew between Khan and the military so this all led to the erosion of this support as well as his political downfall. This study shows how the military always involves itself in government by civilians with consequences for Pakistan's democracy.

Background;

The concept of elites is crucial for understanding Pakistan's political landscape. But first one should know who elites are; Rahman Khan (2012) defines elites as individual or groups that control significant resources social that elevates them above ordinary citizens. Higley (2008) further explains that elites are those who frequently and profoundly influence political decisions. In Pakistan, political elites have historically played a dominant role in shaping governance and policymaking. Scholars like Shafqat (1989) and Khan et al. (2018) have classified the elites into different categories. The first one is political elites and the second one the bureaucracy, which is in turn classified into civilian bureaucracy and military bureaucracy. These institutions have consistently remained at the center of power.

Since independence in 1947, Pakistan's political structure has been dominated by the elite. In contrast to India, which has developed into a consolidated democracy, Pakistan has faced numerous military interventions and weak democratic institutions. The early leaders of the Pakistan Movement, primarily Nawabs and affluent Muslim elites, have prioritized their own political and economic dominance over the establishment of a genuinely democratic state (Hashim & Fatima, 2020). Up to 1950s the civilian bureaucracy has played a significant role in policy making throughout Pakistan's history. However, since the 1950s, Pakistani politics has been dominated by military elite. The purpose of this research is to provide a detailed background on military intervention in politics and to identify the initial factors involved. The study will examine how this apolitical institution influences politics in Pakistan by analyzing Imran Khan's government as a case study.

The fragile political system of Pakistan cannot be fully understood without examining the political influence of the military. Pakistan exhibits the type of state where a powerful military exerts control over the government, society, and economy. The military's penetration into society reinforces its hegemonic control over the state. The Pakistan military stands as the most politically influential institution in the country, with some even considering it the largest political party.

Between 1947 and 1977, for a period of 30 years, the military in Pakistan exhibited characteristics of a ruling-type military, predominantly aiming to dominate the state and its governance, particularly after seizing power in 1958. Although democracy was restored in 1962, because of the worse situation the result was another coup d'état. In the early years, the army governed directly by enforcing Martial Law. This situation shifted when Ayub Khan enacted the Constitution of 1962. He established the military's dominance through his personal oversight of state affairs and politics. Ayub Khan's authoritarian rule ended in 1969 with General Yahya Khan's consolidation

of power. However, this transition did not signify a shift from military rule to civilian supremacy and a step toward consolidating; instead, it was a coup within a coup. The governments of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan were not distinct regimes but rather a single, continuous military rule with only a change in top leadership. The genuine shift, although temporary, occurred in 1972 following the restoration of democracy after the military's defeat in a war against India. This defeat, which led to the loss of the eastern wing and the surrender of 90,000 soldiers, was a shock that pushed the military into the barracks for several years until the second military takeover in 1977.

The timeframe analyzed in this section can be categorized into three segments: 1977-88, 1988-99, and 1999-2005.

In the initial decade, the military engaged in the use of coercion and committed human rights abuses. General Muhammad Zia-ul-haq, who was the chief of the army, assumed control of the government by deposing the democratically elected Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. However, this step questioned his legitimacy as a mediator. From that point onwards, the military shifted its strategy and formed a partnership with select members of the elite class using a combination of subtle coercion and incentives i.e a client-patronage relation.

National elections were conducted on a non-party basis in 1985. The aim of these elections was to find candidates, who belonged to the ruling elite, and will be beneficial for them in future. The outcome of these non-party elections resulted in the emergence of a weak civilian government. Zia appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister. A conflict arose between Zia and Junejo when the latter initiated an investigation into an ammunition depot explosion at Orji near Rawalpindi in April 1988. Consequently, in early 1988, Zia ousted the Junejo administration citing corruption allegations.

The military's safeguards were implemented through the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution. Article 58(2b) granted the President the authority to dismiss the government, assume the role of supreme commander of the armed forces, and appoint the heads of the three military branches and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Such legal mechanisms eliminated the necessity for the armed forces to carry out a coup. Senior generals could simply persuade the President, as long as he was not a military appointee, to disband an elected government. During the 1990s, four governments were dismissed, even though the army chief was no longer in power.

The establishment of the "Revival of the Constitutional Order (RCO)" and the creation of the "National Security Council (NSC)" further exaggerated the military's influence in political matters. Thus, the period from 1977 to 1988 was characterized by the military's continued involvement in politics without overtly displaying its rank and position in the governmental operations.

The military rule came to end with the death of Zia in a plane crash in 1988 and the democracy was restored. During these ten years Pakistan witnessed eight prime ministers, including four caretaker prime ministers. The military as arbiter, tweaked the political system every two years, especially when it saw the civilian regime challenging its authority. As a result of the general election held that brought the PPP to power.

Benazir Bhutto's government was removed in a coup like manner. She got into trouble with the military over the issues important to its interests, such as the appointment of the corps commanders and the chairman of the JCSC. Benazir also replaced the head of the ISI, Lt General Hameed Gul, with Major-General Shamsul Rehman Kallu. This did not make her popular in army and resulted in the dismissal of her government.

Nawaz Sharif, who was product of General Zia, was initially brought to power to help army to overthrow Bhutto's government in 1990. His removal in 1993 was a result of the differences with the army chief over the government's support for the US military initiative against the Iraqi invasion of the Kuwait. Sharif and the army also became estranged because of the disagreements over the military operation in Sindh against the ethnic party Muttahidda Qumi Movement (MQM), which was the ruling party's political partner.

Benazir Bhutto returned into power in 1993, only to be dismissed again in 1996. Haqqani is of view that her dismissal was a result of the struggles of the religious-conservative forces, and the military's realization that she was unable to get continued US support. Bhutto's removal in 1990 and again in 1996 are the symptomatic of the divide and rule game played by the GHQ.

The military's intelligence apparatus played a key role in the division between the political actors. Horse-trading was rife during these ten years, as part of the manipulative mechanism used by the ISI and other intelligence outfit

In recent years, the defense establishment has enhanced its authority through the introduction of additional legal and constitutional provisions, effectively curbing the attempts of civilian authorities to assert their dominance.

In 1999, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was removed from office following a direct confrontation with Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf. This dismissal highlighted the

military's direct control over the government. Three key issues underscored the relative strengthening of Nawaz's political position: General Jahangir Karamat's forced resignation, the Eighth Amendment's reversal, and the initiation of peace talks with Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The military viewed Sharif as a potential threat to their dominance, which ultimately led to his ousting. In contrast to previous leaders, General Musharraf refrained from assuming the title of chief martial law administrator; rather, he adopted the more neutral designation of chief executive. Nevertheless, this action operated as a guise for a coup. To enhance the legitimacy of his regime, Musharraf implemented the Devolution Plan, which allowed for both direct and indirect elections at the local government level. The general elections of 2002, accompanied by a referendum, showcased the military establishment's adeptness at pre-poll manipulation. Despite Musharraf's leadership, authoritarian tendencies persisted, resulting in a new parliament that resembled "old wine in a new bottle." (Siddiqi, 2017)

The Supreme Court legitimized Musharraf's coup through the "Doctrine of Necessity," but with a three-year delay in the parliamentary elections. Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf introduced some political reforms to address his legitimacy by easing restrictions on civil rights, allowing private media, and promoting a little political populism. But once a dictator gives even limited political freedom, the public seems to protest less risky. For Musharraf it was like putting an axe on his foot, protest started against him. Lastly, because of the Lawyers' movement in 2008, Musharraf resigned from his position and was replaced by General Ashfaq Pervez Keyani. The army chief was viewed as liberal and progressive, with the intent to take back the military into the barracks.

Keyani banned military officials from politics, unlike past elections military did not interfere in the 2008 elections to favor a specific political party. Reports also say that the ISI closed its political wing party (PML-Q, or Kings Party). These reforms portrayed Keyani as a sympathizer of democracy, but in actuality it was the very first transformation from "Military as an institution to Military as a Government".

Since 2008, military control has remained high in most areas, except for its formal political role and the appointment of military chief. The military also challenges the government through media and judicial support, creating policy conflicts and damaging the government's credibility. As a result, the civilian government struggles to fully exercise its power, making democratic progress difficult.

Some of the events when the military altered the civilian are given below;

The military aims to keep control over its structure and decisions, preventing civilian oversight. After the transition to democracy, it not only kept but also expanded its power over promotions and appointments. For instance, General Kayani extended the service of several generals beyond retirement age, including ISI head Lt. General Shuja Pasha (2007–2012). In 2010, Kayani secured an extra three years as army chief, limiting the government's ability to appoint its own choice.

In July 2008, the military blocked the government's attempt to bring the ISI under the control of the Interior Ministry. Within hours of the official order, military pressure forced the government to cancel its decision, showing how the military can override civilian authority.

The military closely changes public opinion. The journalist antagonist of the military faces constant threats and blackmailing or even worse. For instance, when journalist Saleem Shahzad exposed links between Al-Qaeda and the Navy, he was abducted and killed in 2011.

The military also uses judiciary to be in power. The Memo-gate scandal of 2011 is prominent example. In the scandal a man proclaimed that the PPP sought help from US against military intervention. The military pressured the Supreme Court to handle the case, weakening civilian authority (Shah, 2013).

Onwards, to maintain its dominance the military had launched several operations like Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014–2017), Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017–2022), which had increased the number of internally displaced persons IDPs.

Imran Khan's party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), emerged as the largest party in the 2018 elections with a manifesto centered on anti-corruption and accountability (Khan, Khan, & Farmanullah, 2022). However, his tenure was characterized by economic inflation, political instability, and institutional challenges, raising questions about whether his administration truly disrupted militant dominance or became another extension. By analyzing the governance style, decision-making patterns, and interactions between PTI and other elite groups, this study aims to assess the extent to which Imran Khan's government reinforced or challenged Pakistan's military.

Methodology

This research employs a qualitative methodology for probing Pakistan's military role in political affairs. The study uses secondary data from various sources to provide a detailed comprehension

of the historical context, the way the military legitimizes its role, together with the weak elected governmental officials.

Theoretical Background

To explain both military professionalism and the military's involvement in the political process, Samuel Huntington had presented a theory of civil-military relations in his book "The Soldier and the State." In the book, he outlines the historical development of military professionalism in Europe and the United States, with a particular emphasis on the constitutional intentions of America's Founding Fathers.

Huntington in his theory of modernization explains that as societies undergo economic and social development, there is an increase in political participation. However, if political institutions are underdeveloped, this hinders political participation, which leads to instability, creating a gap for military intervention (Abenheim, 2003).

This theory can be applied in Pakistan, to have better understanding of the frequent military interventions in its politics. Huntington argued that modernization leads to social mobilization and increased political awareness among the population. In societies where political institutions lack a well-established system to manage this heightened participation, the resulting instability can prompt the military to intervene in governance. Unlike the elected government, the military has brought some modernization reforms, like Ayub brought the basic democrats and the devolution plan of Musharraf. Until 2013, local reforms were initiated by the military, indicating that the military was the only supporter of democracy (Ansari, 2011).

Beyond political mobilization, modernization can also reshape the economy of a country. In Pakistan, economic growth has been accompanied by increased military intervention, a phenomenon referred to as "milbus." One of the leading military-business conglomerates in Pakistan is the Fauji Foundation (FF) (Siddiq, 2017).

Analysis of military influence during Khan's regime

The military influence during the tenure of Imran Khan as a prime minister (2018-2022) has been a focal point of debate. This period witnessed significant military involvement in various aspects of governance and politics. Some of the aspects are the following;

Election Rigging;

The Pakistan Army has recently adopted a new way of exercising control. Instead of direct takeovers, they now use a softer, yet just as effective approach: rigging elections to place handpicked civilian leaders they can later remove at will. This preserves the illusion of democracy, while the military remains the true authority in the background. Amid allegations of military-sponsored election rigging, Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) won its first general election in 2018. Reports indicated severe pre-poll manipulation comprising, as was the case with PML-N and PPP, media blockades, journalist kidnappings, and even political party 'crossing over' to PTI. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan branded the 2018 elections as one of the "dirtiest and most micromanaged" polls in the nation's history. A populist-turned-politician cricketer, Khan was considered the military's preferred candidate, a narrative that supported his affiliation with Bajwa, the Pakistan army chief. However, the allegations collapsed when Khan rejected the military selection of the ISI chief in 2022, the military immediately withdrew their support from Khan and removed him from his office through a no-confidence vote.

The grip of the military on democracy is further revealed during the general elections on 8 February 2024. Despite the popularity and civilian support of Khan, the military launched an unending assault on his party. Khan was jailed on various charges, including a 10-year sentence for breaking the Official Secrets Act. In a nation where symbols are used to guide a mainly illiterate audience, PTI suffered a serious setback when it lost its electoral symbol. The PTI's candidates were compelled to run as independents, and thousands of its employees were detained. On election day, cell phone and internet services were cut down, and the delay in results announcements exacerbated claims of vote rigging. Despite these obstacles, PTI-backed independents won 93 seats to PML-N's 82 and PPP's 68 in the 336-seat National Assembly. Yet, the military supported a coalition between PMLN (led by Shehbaz Sharif) and PPP, leading to Shehbaz Sharif becoming the Prime Minister. This ensured the military-preferred outcomes in the political landscape. (mann, 2025)

Interference in Democracy

Pakistan is not new to military intervention in civilian matters. Pakistan faced its first coup in 1958, hardly a decade after its formation in 1947. From the late 19s, the country faces 4 successful and some unsuccessful military coups, and still the military controls things from the backstage. The charisma, Rise, and fame of Imran Khan, a former cricketer, has allowed the military to beat the PPP and PMLN, the two popular parties. so they started supporting him and the military cooperated repeatedly as "the defenders" and "voice of the people" against each other,"

The PTI was founded as an anti-elite and anti-corruption party that sought to bring social justice, equity and welfare. It wanted to make politics for the people, it was reformist in the beginning. The pro-establishment stance brought it close to the military, meantime General Musharraf removed the sitting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from his office. Khan's response to this was that the elite and corrupt leadership had come to an end and Musharraf would benefit the country. During this era, the relationship between the army and the PTI was friendly.

Musharraf offered Khan an important role in politics and a large number of seats in the 2002 national elections but he refused he had to support the corrupt politicians. And in turn, PTI secured 1 seat in 2002 elections.

Khan's opposition to the army activities and involvement led to him being put on house arrest for several times. With Musharraf in exile and the PPP and PMLN in federal and provincial government, there was little hope for the PTI to come into government. Khan's original supporters have lost faith, and the party struggles to gain power in the political arena. Similarly, military needs an ally after Musharraf's undignified removal, so, it seems that the two most probably decided to strike a deal. The military started supporting Khan by providing him with allies and media coverage.

In 2018, the Pakistani army deployed 371,000 troops to secure polling station and the vote counting was delayed for several hours. And because of the army, PTI won the elections and came into power. In office, Khan has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Pakistan army. A huge change in his previous stance was visible, when court announces the public hanging of Musharraf and Khan himself urged to not allow Musharraf to escape trial. Also Khan gave a three year extension to the chief of army staff (COAS), Qamar Javed Bajwa, after his normal three-year tenure ended in 2019, although previously Khan himself had publicly declared that giving Army Chiefs extensions undermines democracy. (Yilmaz & Saleem, 2022)

Surveillance

The Pakistan army has control over various state institutions during the PTI government. It included judiciary, media, domestic politics etc. Six senior Pakistani judges have accused the inter-service intelligence, the country's powerful spy agency, of interfering in the judicial matters and using illegal tactics such as abduction and torture of their family members. They sent letters to them, which is then made public on Tuesday evening in March 2024. They pressurize the judges through abduction and torture of their family and relatives and secret surveillance within their residences. (Hussain, 2024).

In 2023, journalists in Pakistan faced accusations of inciting mutiny and defaming Pakistan's military. Most of the journalists fled Pakistan, they include freelancers Wajahat Saeed Khan, Shaheen Sehba, Moeed Pirzada and Sabir Shakir. The head of the RSF's Asia Pacific desk, Daniel Bastard, told in a press release that 'the credibility of rule of law in Pakistan, and above all, judicial independence in the face of unacceptable military interference is at stake' he also said that 'make no mistake—the sole purpose of this ludicrous complaint ... is to intimidate the two journalists into silence...'

The allegations against the journalists stem from violent nationwide protests and resistance to the 9 May arrest of former PM Imran Khan on corruption charges. (Gul, 2022)

The military also censored media especially after the conflict with the Khan. The government had a tight control on both electronic and print media on the flow of information. Most media houses are forced to censor and broadcast filtered news and information, and show the sitting government and military positively. (Ashraf, 2024) In 2024, the journalist Amir Mehmood told Aljazeera that when he was getting ready for work, he got message on Whatsapp from the top official from military who told him to not use PTI flag or mention their affiliation with the candidate backed by the party. Mehmood told that 'It instructed us to identify candidate as 'independent' and not show which party they were related to'. (Hussain, 2024).

Influence over Pakistan's judiciary

During the Imran Khan government, Islamabad High Court (IHC) was pressurized by military-linked intelligence to change verdicts. As mentioned, six IHC judges wrote an open letter to Pakistan's supreme judicial council that the ISI had been forcing judges to alter their judicial decisions. (Hussain, 2024). One of the judge's brother-in-law was abducted and tortured by an ISI individual, another judge says that he found a secret camera in his residence, mainly in the living room and bedroom. (Hussain, 2024).

The military also influenced judicial appointments. In Oct, the Parliament signed the 26th amendment into law, which grants the government more power over the country's top judiciary, the Supreme Court. The bill limits the chief justice's tenure to three years and the new chief justice will be appointed from the three senior judges of the Supreme Court through the new special parliamentary committee. This bill weakens the independence of the judiciary. (The Implications of Pakistan's Controversial Judicial Reform, 2024).

Foreign policy

Prime Minister Imran Khan just after six months in his office passed a foreign policy test, but the Pakistan military backed it. Who had set the stage for the country's regional diplomacy and the efforts took almost two years. The former COAS Qamar Javed Bajwa also set things with allies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Imran Khan government had shown some hesitation to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) but Bajwa visited China to restore the project because there were concerns related to Saudi Arabia's potential involvement following tension with Iran. During General Bajwa's three-day visit to China in September, Zhang Youxia, the deputy chairman of China's powerful Central Military Commission said that the 'military ties are an important backbone' to the China-Pakistan relationship. Similarly on the Middle Eastern front, Bajwa in 2018 visited Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar. Pakistan gave full support to safeguard Saudi sovereignty, and promised Qatar to give security in 2012 football world cup which was hosted by Qatar. Qatar and Pakistan also agreed upon support for the Afghan regional dialogues. Bajwa became the first army chief who had an official trip to Tehran in two decades to work on the better relations with Iran.

During the Taliban peace talks and the India-Pakistan dispute, the Pakistan Army and Khan not only convinced the Chinese but also the Saudis, Qataris, and Americans that Pakistan has a new regional diplomacy. In one of his speeches, Khan said that Civil-Military relations are now on the same page. (Alam, 2019).

Covid-19 Pandemic

The Pakistan military has always played a significant role in Pakistan's political decisions and had a great influence on government entities. During the coronavirus pandemic, the army stepped in to deal with the pandemic and deployed troops nationwide to ensure curfews and lockdowns. The first coronavirus case in Pakistan was reported on 26 Feb 2020. The PM Imran Khan opposed the lockdown first, saying it would ruin the economy. The military opposed the Khan's decision and took over the situation in March, spreading troops over the country to ensure civilian troops. The military increased influence on government, showing a positive influence on controlling the pandemic. By implementing lockdowns in the country, the infected cases and the death rate saw a huge decline from June to Aug 2020.

However, the military involvement fulfills the gaps in the areas where the government is weak. On the other side, it also shows the weak administration of the Khan's government. And it also shows that the military is more capable and has more power and ability to have direct control over the government. It created fear amongst the civilian that the military will take over the government, it also believed that the military is always waiting for the opportunity to strengthen their authoritarian tendencies and make people believe that the military is the only guardian of the country.

The first case of virus in Pakistan was brought by the pilgrims from Iran. It shows the weakness of government, because they know that Iran had already the outbreak, but still the federal government failed to provide proper precautions and failed to properly quarantine and screen civilians. On the other hand, the Khan in his first appearance to public says in his speech that "there was no need to panic because for the majority, the disease would feel like mild flu". He was also against the lockdown saying that it would hurt the poor people because they are dependent on their daily income. The situation not only violates the human rights but also weakens and hurts the Khan's government. And when the situation gets out of control, he blames the civilians for taking the pandemic for granted. (Jabeen, 2020)

PTI Downfall:

The downfall of the PTI government started because of some reason such as mismanaging the establishment. PTI came into power with the support of the establishment, Imran Khan, as a prime minister has one hundred percent support from the establishment, which no leaders had enjoyed before. Despite all this, Khan ignored the establishment in every decision and policy-making, finally exploding the controversy over the appointment of the DG ISI. The other reason was not creating a smooth and working relationship with the opposition parties, appointing Buzdar as the chief minister of Punjab, and many more. (Husain, 2022).

In 2023, a joint opposition alliance, a rainbow of socialist, liberal, and radically religious parties, was formed against the ruling party, led by PMLN and PPP, which accused Khan's government of **economic mismanagement, authoritarianism, and a strained relationship with key institutions**. As tensions grew, the opposition moved a **vote of no-confidence** in the National Assembly — a constitutional tool to remove a sitting Prime Minister. After several weeks of political maneuvering, legal battles, and public protests, the vote was finally held on **10 April 2023**. Imran Khan lost the vote, marking the **first time in Pakistan's history** that a Prime Minister was **removed through a no-confidence motion**. (Pakistan PM Imran Khan ousted in no-confidence vote, 2022).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The research thoroughly investigates how Pakistan's military plays a secure role in the political process, especially under the Pakistan PTI government that was led by Khan. Pakistan has historically faced repeated interruptions to democratic governance because of military takeovers or indirect interference since Ayub Khan took power in a 1958 coup continuing through successive eras of military-dominated politics. This control pattern has affected political stability in addition to deeply affecting institutional development. It did also affect the public trust that is in democracy behind the scenes, and it also did so in a direct way.

Khan's case study shows a modern variant of this old pattern. This research highlights the story of how he rose to power in 2018 since it was so strongly supported by the military establishment. After they had fallen out away from customary political elites like Nawaz Sharif, they saw him as a civilian partner who was quite favorable. However, this union soon failed because it displayed the military's active desire to retain control of key policy areas such as foreign affairs, internal security, and media regulation. The eventual breakdown between PTI and the military establishment, which followed Khan's ouster in 2022, underscores the fragile nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan with the risks of civilian leaders relying upon military patronage. With accuracy, the paper identifies structural issues including weak civilian institutions and a politicized judiciary. That dominance is allowed, as democratic continuity is lacking, so the military maintains dominance. Transparency and accountability suffer when the media and judiciary are pressured into military narratives. Civilian leaders who were complicit in inviting military support settled political rivalries which perpetuated military dominance or what Ayesha Siddiqi calls "milbus".

Recommendations

To minimize and control military interventions and involvement in government agencies and Pakistan's politics certain recommendations are needed. There must be institutional reform. Parliament needs to exercise its authority and reclaim control of budget oversight, particularly in the case of the defense budget, which is still shrouded in mystery.

Political parties must stop personality-driven politics. Internal party democracy, open party funding and policy-centered platforms could make them stronger alternatives to military-backed governments. Illustrative: The Charter of Democracy (2006) between the PPP and PML-N provided a moment of at least rhetorical bi-partisan consensus on curtailing military intervention. But the struggle's half-baked outcome also shows that political unanimity can erode. As individual is the basic unit of political development. To ensure the minimize role of military in politics there should be civilian supremacy. Article 6 of the constitution considers the military intervention as a treason. Henceforth, the constitution must be implemented in his true sense. In addition, the key appointments must be gone by parliamentary committee rather than authoritarian leaders. To conclude measures like the 18th Amendment, which gave provinces autonomy must be increased. Huntington mentioned in his book "The soldier and the state" that, the more the modernization, the less will be the military intervention. The government should work on the development of society, increase industries, work on technology and other social developments. Because the more the development less the military intervention. The military will find it hard to interfere and control each and everything so automatically they will only focus on their field, and will only focus on the defense and security of the state. Also, the more the development less will be the poverty rate. There will be less internal threats and more unity. In order to minimize internal threats, the government official should have proper discussions with insurgents' group like the Baloch Yakjehtti Committee, Baloch Liberation Army, Tehreek-i-Taliban etc. Measures like the negotiation between Maulana Fazul-ur-Rahman and the TTP in December must be taken in future. The judiciary must exercise its independence by refusing to implement extra constitutional acts for the military. The judges shouldn't be blackmailed by other government employees. And both judges and judiciary must be neutral in terms of decision and politics. The judiciary must not have any political party's affiliations. The judiciary must act independently without any fear and force. Acts and amendments that legalize like the Doctrine of Necessity the military must be abolished in Pakistan.

References:

- Abenheim, D. (2003). American Civil-Military Relations: Samuel P. Huntington and the Political Dimensions of the Military Professionalism. *Naval War College Review*, 65(2), 88-104. Retrieved from <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/7>
- Alam, k. (2019, march monday). A Confident Pakistan Army Recalibrates the Country's Regional Policies. *Rusi*. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistani-journalists-face-criminal-proceedings-for-criticizing-military-/6586070.html>

- Ali, S., & Khan, M. F. (2020). Pakistani Bureaucracy: Crisis of Governance, Prospects and Recommendation Reforms. *Electronic Research Journal of Science and Humanities*, 2(1). Retrieved from <https://www.eresearchjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/9.-Pakistani-Bureaucracy-Crises-of-Governance-Prospects-and-Recommended-Reforms-1.pdf>
- Ansari, S. H. (2011, june). Forced Modernization and Public Policy: A Case Study of Ayub Khan Era (1958-69). *Journal of Political Studies*, 18(1), 45-60. Retrieved from <https://jps.pu.edu.pk/6/article/view/180>
- Ashraf, a. (2024, december monday). freedom under fire:pakistan streiking media space and recent internet censorship. media diversity.
- Baloch, S. M. (2022, june sunday). Fear for democracy in Pakistan as ISI gets power over civil service. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/12/fear-for-democracy-in-pakistan-as-isi-gets-power-over-civil-service>
- Briskey, D. M. (2022). The Foundations of Pakistan's Strategic Culture Fears of an Irredentist India, Muslim Identity, Martial Race, and Political Realism. *Journal of Advanced Military Studies*, Special Issue on Strategic Culture(1). doi:10.21140/mcu.2022SIstratcul008
- Cohen, S. P. (2004). *The Pakistan Army* (Second Edition (Revised and Updated) ed.). Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press.
- Fear for democracy in Pakistan as ISI gets power over civil service appointments. (2022). *THE NEWSMAN*.
- Gul, A. (2022, june thursday). Pakistan journalists face mutiny charges after criticizing military. voice of america. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistani-journalists-face-criminal-proceedings-for-criticizing-military-/6586070.html>
- Hashim , Z., & Fatima , T. (2020). Dynamics of Ruling Elite Structure and Status Quo. *Journal of Historical Studies*, VI.
- Haqqani, H. (2022, October Thursday). Pakistan's Military Is Here to Stay. *Foreign Policy magazine*, 87(6), p. 02.
- Hashim, A. (2019, august thursday). Silenced': Pakistan's journalists decry new era of censorship. *Al Jazeera*.
- Husain, F. (2022, april saturday). why did pti fail ? dawn, pp. 1-4.
- Hussain, a. (2024, march wednesday). judges vs spies:Pakistan's jurists accuse intel agency ISI of intimidation. *aljazeera*.
- Hussian, a. (2024, january thursday). don't cover imran khan's pti:pakistan's media told to censor popular ex-PM. *al jazeera*.
- Idrees , M., & Khan , N. (2018). A Survey of the Role of Judiciary in Validating Military and Authoritarian Regimes in Pakistan. *Sociology and Criminology-Open Access*, 6(1), 4.
- Ahmad, T., Khan, W., Rahman, A. U., Zaman, F., & Hamid, M. (2024). POPULIST POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN THREK-E-INSAF (PTI) FROM 2018-2023. *Social Science Review Archives*, 2(2), 494-504.
- Jabeen, S. (2020, nov sunday). Pakistan's Military "Games" Continue During the COVID-19 Pandemic, and Democracy Loses Out. *democratic erosion consortium*.
- Khan, I., Khan , R., & Farmanullah . (2022). The Continuation of Democracy in Pakistan; an analysis of 2018 General Elections. *Global Politics Review*.
- Mann, a. (2025, march friday). Democracy Hijacked: Pakistan's Civilian Puppets And The Military's Iron Grip – Analysis. *eurasia review news and anlysis*, p. 7.
- Muneer , S., & Aryal, S. (2024). Cause and Effect: The Factors that make Pakistan's militry a political force. *observer research foundation*, 25.
- Muneer , S., & Aryal, S. (2024, february). Cause and Effect: The Factors that Make Pakistan's Military a Political Force. *ORF Issue Brief*(694).
- Pakistan PM Imran Khan ousted in no-confidence vote. (2022, 10 sunday). *al jazeera*.
- Razaaq, f. (2024). Beyond the Barracks: Exploring the Profound Reasons behind Military Intrusion in Politics of Pakistan. *Pakistan Languages and Humanities Review*, 8(2), 273–284.
- Reporter, s. (2025, may). In a first, ISI chief made the National Security Advisor. *DAWN*.
- Shah, A. (2013). Constraining consolidation: military politics and democracy in Pakistan (2007–2013). *Journal pf Statistics*, 21(6).
- Siddiq, A. (2017). *Military Inc. Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* 2nd Edition . Puto Press .
- The Implications of Pakistan's Controversial Judicial Reform. (2024, october monday). *Rane , worldview*.
- Warraich, a. y. (2022, january wednesday). Military's constitutional role. *dawn*, 3.
- Warraich, A. Y. (2022, december thursday). Military's Constitutional Role. *Dawn*.

- Yilmaz, i., & saleem, r. M. (2022, march tuesday). Military and Populism: A Global Tour with a Special Emphasis on the Case of Pakistan. European center for populism studies.
- Zeidan, a. (2025, april). Pakistan tehrek-e-insaf, political party Pakistan. Britinicca.
- Ziring, L. (1997). Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (First Edition ed.). Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Pressv.